No,
the World Is Not Multipolar
The
idea of emerging power centers is popular but wrong—and could lead to serious
policy mistakes.
By Jo Inge Bekkevold,
a senior China fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies.
September 22, 2023
One of the most persistent arguments put forward by
politicians, diplomats, and observers of international politics is that the
world is or soon will be multipolar. In recent months, this argument has been
made by U.N.
Secretary-General António Guterres, German
Chancellor Olaf Scholz, German Foreign
Minister Annalena Baerbock, French
President Emmanuel Macron, Brazilian
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and Russian
President Vladimir Putin. Josep Borrell, the European Union’s high
representative for foreign affairs, argues that that the world has been a
system of “complex
multipolarity” ever since the 2008 global financial crisis.
The idea is also being popularized in the business
world: Morgan Stanley, the investment bank, recently issued
a strategy paper for “navigating a multipolar world,” while INSEAD, a respected
European business school, is concerned
about leadership skills in such a world.
But despite what politicians, pundits, and investment
bankers tell us, it is simply a myth that today’s world is anywhere close to
multipolar.
The reasons are straightforward. Polarity simply
refers to the number of great powers in the international system—and for the
world to be multipolar, there have to be three or more such powers. Today,
there are only two countries with the economic size, military might, and global
leverage to constitute a pole: the United States and China. Other great powers
are nowhere in sight, and they won’t be any time soon. The mere fact that there
are rising middle powers and nonaligned countries with large populations and
growing economies does not make the world multipolar.
The absence of other poles in the international system
is evident if we look at the obvious candidates. In 2021, fast-growing India
was the third-largest spender on defense, which is one indicator to measure
power. But according to the latest figures from the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, its military budget is only one-quarter
of China’s. (And China’s
numbers may be even higher than commonly believed.) Today, India is still
largely concentrated on its own development. It has an undersized foreign
service, and its navy—an important yardstick for leverage in the
Indo-Pacific—is small compared to China’s, which has launched five
times more naval tonnage over the past five years. India may one day be a
pole in the system, but that day belongs in the distant future.
Economic wealth is another indicator for the ability
to wield power. Japan has the third-largest economy in the world, but according
to the latest figures from the International Monetary Fund, its GDP is less
than one-quarter
of China’s. Germany, India, Britain, and France—the next four largest economies
in the world—are even smaller.
Nor is the European Union a third pole, even if that
argument has been tirelessly advanced by Macron and many others. European
states have varying national interests, and their union is prone to rifts. For
all the apparent unity in the European Union’s support for Ukraine, there is
simply no unified European defense, security, or foreign policy. There is a
reason that Beijing, Moscow, and Washington converse with Paris and Berlin—and
rarely seek out Brussels.
Russia is, of course, a potential candidate for
great-power status based on its land area, massive natural resources, and huge
stockpile of nuclear weapons. The country certainly has an impact beyond its
borders—it is waging a major European war and drove Finland and Sweden to join
NATO. Nonetheless, with an economy smaller than Italy’s and a military budget
equaling only one-quarter of China’s at most, Russia does not qualify as a
third pole in the international system. At most, Russia can play a supporting
role for China.
A widespread argument among those who believe in
multipolarity is the rise of the global south and the shrinking
position of the West. However, the presence of old and new middle
powers—India, Brazil, Turkey, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia are often named as
additions to the roster—does not make the system multipolar, since none of
these countries has the economic power, military might, and other forms of
influence to be a pole of its own. In other words, these countries lack ability
to vie with the United States and China.
And while it is true that the United States’ share of
the global economy has been receding, it retains a dominant position,
especially when considered together with China. The two great powers account
for half of the world’s total defense spending, and their combined GDP roughly
equals the 33 next-largest economies added together.
The expansion of the BRICS forum at its summit in
Johannesburg last month (previously, the block included only Brazil, Russia,
India, China, and South Africa) is interpreted
as a sign that the multipolar order is here or at least being advanced.
However, blocs are too heterogeneous to function as poles—and they can easily
fall apart. BRICS is nowhere near a coherent bloc, and while member states may
share views on the international economic order, they have widely divergent
interests in other areas. In security policy—the strongest
indicator of alignment—the two largest members, China and India, are at odds.
Indeed, Beijing’s rise is driving New Delhi to align
itself more closely with the United States.
So, if the world is not multipolar, why is the
multipolarity argument so popular? In addition to the lazy way that it ignores
facts and concepts about international relations, three obvious explanations
stand out.
First, for many people who advance the idea of
multipolarity, it is a normative concept. It is another way of saying—or
hoping—that the age of Western dominance is over and that power is or should be
diffuse. Guterres regards multipolarity as a way to fix multilateralism and
bring equilibrium
to the world system. For many European leaders, multipolarity is seen as a preferred
alternative to bipolarity, because the former is believed to better enable
a world governed by rules, allow
for global partnerships with diverse actors, and prevent the emergence of new
blocs.
Indeed, the multilateral framework is certainly not
working the way it is supposed to, and many in the West view the idea of
multipolarity as a fairer system, a better way to revive
multilateralism, and an opportunity to repair
the growing disconnect with the global south. In other words, belief in a
multipolarity that does not exist is part of an entire bouquet of hopes and
dreams for the global order.
A second reason that the idea of multipolarity is in
vogue is that, after three decades of globalization and relative peace, there
is a great deal of reluctance among policymakers, commentators, and academics
to accept the realities of an intense, all-encompassing, and polarizing bipolar
rivalry between the United States and China. In this regard, belief in
multipolarity is a kind of intellectual avoidance—and an expression of the wish
that there not be another cold war.
Third, talk about multipolarity is often part of a
power play. Beijing and Moscow see multipolarity as a way of curtailing U.S.
power and advancing their own position. As far back as 1997, when the United
States was the dominant power by far, Russia and China signed
the Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New
International Order. Even though China is a great power today, it still views
the United States as its main challenge; together with Moscow, Beijing uses the
idea of multipolarity as a way to flatter the global south and attract it to
its cause. Multipolarity has been a central theme
of China’s diplomatic charm offensive throughout 2023, while Putin declared
at the Russia-Africa summit in July that the leaders in attendance had agreed
to promote a multipolar world. Similarly, when leaders of rising middle powers
promote the idea of multipolarity—such as Lula in Brazil—it is often an attempt
to position their country as a leading nonaligned nation.
One might wonder whether polarity—and widespread
misconceptions about it—even matter. The simple answer is that the number of
poles in the global order matters greatly, and misconceptions obscure strategic
thinking, ultimately leading to the wrong policies. Polarity matters for two
very important reasons.
First, states face different degrees of constraint
on their behavior in unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar systems, requiring
different strategies and policies. For instance, the new German national
security strategy, released in June, states
that the “international and security environment is becoming more multipolar
and less stable.” Multipolar systems are indeed regarded as less
stable than unipolar and bipolar systems. In multipolar systems, the great
powers build alliances and coalitions in order to avoid one state dominating
the others, which can lead to continuous realignments and sudden shifts if a
major power changes allegiance. In a bipolar system, the two superpowers mainly
balance each other out, and they are never in doubt about who the main rival
is. We should, therefore, hope that the German strategy paper is wrong.
Polarity matters for businesses as well. Morgan
Stanley and INSEAD are preparing their clients and students for a multipolar
world, but pursuing multipolar strategies in a system that remains bipolar
could prove to be a costly mistake. This is because trade and investment flows
can be very different depending on the number of poles. In bipolar systems, the
two great powers will be very concerned about relative gains, leading to a more
polarized and divided economic order. Each type of order comes with different
geopolitical risks, and a mistaken strategy on where a company should build its
next factory can be very costly.
Second, advocating a multipolar world when it is
clearly bipolar could give the wrong signals to friends and foes alike. The
international stir caused by Macron’s statements during his visit to China in April
illustrates the point. In an interview on his plane during the flight back to
Europe, Macron reportedly emphasized the importance for Europe to become a third
superpower. Macron’s willingness to muse
about multipolarity did not go down well with French allies
in Washington and Europe. His Chinese hosts appeared delighted,
but if they confuse Macron’s reflections about multipolarity with French and
European willingness to support Beijing in the U.S.-China rivalry, they may
have gotten the wrong signals.
A multipolar system may be less overtly polarized than
a world with two adversarial superpowers, but it would not necessarily lead to
a better world. Instead of being a quick fix for multilateralism, it could just
as well lead to further regionalization. Rather than wishing for multipolarity
and spending energy on a system that does not exist, a more effective strategy
would search for better solutions and platforms for dialogue within the
existing bipolar system.
In the long term, the world may indeed become
multipolar, with India being the most obvious candidate to join the ranks of
the United States and China. Nevertheless, that day is still far off. We will
be living in a bipolar world for the foreseeable future—and strategy and policy
should be designed accordingly.
Jo Inge Bekkevold is a senior China fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies
and a former Norwegian diplomat.
(United Nations)
(United Nations)
(Federal Reserve)
(Federal Reserve)
(Reserve Bank of Australia)